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Abstract
This study examined explicit learning and its role in 
establishing implicit and explicit knowledge. It also attempted 
to determine whether the knowledge that subjects acquire in a 
finite state grammar task with explicit learning instructions is 
unconsciously or consciously represented. Subjects classified 
both grammatical and nongrammatical strings, individually. In 
a memory-transfer test, the consequences on explicit learning 
were examined under two conditions, one a speeded judgment 
designed to tap implicit knowledge, and one a more reflective 
judgment designed to tap explicit knowledge. At rule 
assessment subjects reported what it was about the strings 
that guided their grammaticality judgments. Subjects were 
able to transfer the knowledge over a narrow range of stimuli, 
and explicit learning resulted in both explicit and implicit 
knowledge, revealed by classification performance during 
memory-transfer test. Transfer to new strings within the old 
letter set was found in the explicit memory test. It was 
demonstrated through the prediction of the proportion of 
correct responses by the subjects' reported rule validities that 
the knowledge that subjects acquired and used was 
consciously represented, and an alternative characterization 
of implicit/explicit learning is supported.
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One of the most central and controversial questions of 
the cognitive paradigm is the nature of mental reptesentation. 
Cognitive psychology and cognitive science alike have probed
into the nature of mental representation and what has 
emerged is the standard cognitivist view. As Gardner (1987) 
put it: "To my mind, the major accomplishment of cognitive 
science has been the clear demonstration of the validity of 
positing a level of mental representation...but this form of 
representation does not involve processes of which the 
organism is in any way conscious or aware" (pp.383-384). 
The foundations of the standard view are built upon the 
assertions that symbolic representation is unconscious and 
that an unconscious system symbolizes and functions
independently of conscious processes (Dennett, 1987; 
Gardner, 1987; Kihlstrom, 1987; Pylyshyn, 1984; Velmans 
1991). Cognitive activity resides in the unconscious, and 
consciousness is a sometime, non-obligatory epiphenomenon 
of inherently unconscious mental activity. Despite the 
profound effect that the standard cognitivist view has had on 
the cognitive disciplines, the literature that is presented in its 
support is lacking strong, sound, replicable effects. Studies 
demonstrating unconscious symbolic representation often
Explicit Learning
5
reveal weak effects, are frequently artifactual. and are difficult 
to replicate. For these reasons the standard cognitvlst view is 
critically being re-examined, and an alternative view has 
emerged
The aiternative view of mental representation is 
characterized by conscious symbolic representation and the 
intentionaiity of consciousness (Dulany, 1991). Intentionality 
consists of an interaction between agency, mode, and content. 
An intentional state is one in which an agent entertains a 
content in some mode, and that content is about something. 
The intentional state is then used deiiberatively or 
automatically depending on the form of the mental episode. 
There are two forms of mental episodes, each consisting of 
nonconscious operations on conscious states and the contents 
they carry. A deliberative mental episode yields a 
propositional state from other propositional states, and is 
predicative. Inferences, decisions, and judgments are all 
deliberative operations. A deliberative episode can be
exemplified by the statement "I believe th a t______", where
the blank would be filled by a proposition or predication. 
Evocative mental episodes, on the other hand, are 
characterized by the automatic evocation of one 
nonpredicative content by another by an activation operation. 
For example, I can have the perception, memory, or fear o f
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. where the blank would be filled by a nonpropoiitional 
content. Both deliberative and evocative mental episodes 
consist of nonconscious operation upon and yield conscious 
intentional states. What the standard view thinks of as 
unconscious and automatic is viewed as a relatively inflexible 
activational connection between conscious contents of the 
nonpredicative kind, and what many think of as conscious is 
viewed as flexible, deliberative operations on predicative 
contents on the alternative view.
A critical line of research that examines the standard 
cognitivist view and the alternative mentalistic view is that of 
implicit and explicit learning. On the standard view of implicit 
learning it is claimed that the acquisition of complex 
knowledge is automatic and unconscious, and that the 
(•suiting knowledge is an unconscious abstract representation 
of the structure of the task. This abstract knowledge then 
guides judgments and decisions about subsequent information 
that reveal learning. In contrast, explicit learning is 
considered to be an alternate mode that employs conscious 
attention and results in knowledge that is accessible to 
consciousness. Demonstrations of implicit learning assume 
the learning of tasks thought to be beyond the conscious 
ability of subjects, and require learning that is independent of 
reports of awareness of what the experimenter thinks the
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subjects learned and used. Experiment! demonstrating the 
standard view of implicit learning often suffer from 
methodological limitations. Effects supporting the hypothesis 
generated from this view are not found when artifacts are 
removed, and furthermore, more robustly revealed effects 
should be found if implicit learning procedures do in fact 
result in unconscious representation. Experimental reanalysis 
strongly challenges the standard interpretation of implicit 
learning experiments.
Subsequent research concerning the reanalysis of 
implicit learning has been done with arbitrary domains with 
complex structures, such as artificial grammar learning 
(Reber, 1967, 1976), simulated control systems (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Sanderson, 1988), 
sequential structures (Lewicki, Hill, St Bizot, 1988; Stadler, 
1992), and covariation of types of information in social 
perception and other domains (Lewicki, 198S, 1986a). Not all 
of the results have provided evidence for implicit learning, 
however (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Dulany St Poldrack, 
1991; Dulany & Wilson, 1990; Perruchet, Gallego, St Savy,
1990; Perruchet St Pacteau, 1990). Converging lines of 
evidence from four general research strategies, the finite state 
grammar paradigm, the sequence paradigm, the systems
etitically te-
th e  implicit-explicit distinction in letrning was first 
examined with studies concerning artificial grammars based 
on finite-state systems, and the results of these studies 
suggested that learning could be an unconscious process 
yielding abstract knowledge (Reber, 1965, 1967). Reber 
(1967) presented subjects with strings of letters that appeared 
arbitrary but were actually generated by a synthetic grammar 
that defined permissible letters and transitions between them. 
After studying representative exemplars, subjects were then 
informed that the letter strings were governed by a complex 
set of rules and were asked to classify new grammatical and 
nongrammetical strings with the same letters based on the old 
grammar. Subjects' classification performance above chance 
level indicated that they had learned the rules, yet their 
explicit knowledge of the structure of the task was poor. In a 
series of articles, Reber (1967, 1969, 1976) argued for 
implicit learning in which complex abstract knowledge is 
acquired unconsciously, held tacitly, and stored as an abstract 
representational system. He proposed that the critical 
features of this type of learning is that it is an unconscious 
process and that the resulting knowledge is abstract in the
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sense that it is about the relative invariaftce of the underlying 
grammar, not overt knowledge of explicit letter locations and 
groups.
The claim that information could be Inquired 
independently of consciousness presented ft difficulty for 
many researchers. In a replication of Rater's (1976) study 
and Reber and Allen's (1978) procedure, Oulany et at. (1984) 
found that subjects' performance of judging grammaticality of 
novel test strings could be attributed to conscious rules within 
informal grammars. They asked subjects during classification 
to mark the part of the string that either made it grammatical 
or nongrammatical according to the rules. The validities of 
these reported rules strongly predicted correct judgments 
without exceeding the value that their mean validities 
predicted, or without significant residual. They proposed that 
subjects acquired correlated grammars that are limited in 
scope and imperfectly valid. The finding of no significant 
residual of prediction from conscious rules runs counter to 
the original conclusion that the acquired information is tacit 
and unavailable to consciousness. In a later study (Carlson & 
Dulany, 1985) a correspondence between rule validity and 
accuracy of classification that could not be attributed to 
unconscious control processes was also found. Accordingly.
no evidence was found for the standard claim of unconieioui
learning.
Responding to Dulany el ai.'s (1914) conclusion, Reber. 
Alien, and Ragan (1985) called into question the methodology 
that was used to assess awareness of rules. They stated that 
the forced justification procedure used could not distinguish 
between what is known explicitly and what is known at a more 
intuitive, unconscious level; thus, the assertion that the rules 
produced by subjects were explicit was not adequate. Reber et 
al. (1985) further claimed that the learner does not learn 
conscious knowledge of explicit letter groups and locations, 
but rather that he or she acquires abstract knowledge about 
the underlying structure of the grammar.
In their commentary of Reber et al (1985), Dulany and 
his colleagues (Dulany, Carlson, At Dewey, 1985) replied that 
they had obtained an accurate assessment of conscious rules 
at the moment of judgment, rather than guessed justifications 
of unconsciously controlled judgments. This was supported by 
computer simulations showing that guessing of rules would 
yield the obtained results only about one in ten billion 
occasions. They theorized that "mental episodes consist of 
conscious states yielded from other conscious states by 
nonconscious operations" (Dulany et al., 1985, p. 30). 
Therefore, the conscious status of a letter string is the result
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of a conscious rule by a nonconscious operation of judgment. 
This issue is discussed in more detail in a later section of this 
article.
A fundamental issue concerning implicit learning of 
synthetic grammars regards the conclusion reached in Reber’s 
(196S) study that the knowledge acquired was unavailable to 
consciousness. There have been just as many results that 
support the claim (Abrams & Reber, 1988; Reber, 1967, 1969; 
Reber & Allen, 1978) as there are that provide evidence 
against it (Dulany et al., 1984; Mathews et al., 1989; Perruchet 
& Pacteau, 1990). It is interesting to consider the conclusions 
derived from Reber and Allen’s (1978) study. In their 
examination of the proposed unconscious representation of 
the grammar, they found that subjects could verbally cite 
specific aspects of the letter strings that were important in 
classification, such as bigrams and trigrams. Despite this 
result and lack of evidence to show whether unconscious rules 
could explain grammatical judgments, they still concluded that 
"...[but they] also have a solid but tacit apprehension of the 
grammatical structure which serves them on those occasions 
when they have no conscious criteria" (Reber & Allen, 1978, p. 
212) .
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) obtained similar results, 
but offered a different conclusion. They proposed that
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fragmentary conscious knowledge of permissible pairs of 
letters was sufficient to account for grammaticality judgments, 
a position similar to that taken by Dulany et al. (1984).
Subjects who studied pairs of letters performed just as well on 
tests of grammaticality as did subjects studying letter strings. 
Well-formedness assessments were poor but still significantly 
better than chance when the ungrammatical status of the 
letter string stemmed from the wrong location of a permissible 
bigram. This runs counter to the proposed idea that above­
chance performance on classification tests provides evidence 
that subjects can acquire abstract complex rules, but rather 
that the knowledge was available in consciousness.
Performance observed in typical artificial grammar learning 
studies thus can not be attributed to the subjects' ability to 
abstract rules. Rather, conscious knowledge of pairs of 
consecutive letters composing the items can account for 
performance and there is no evidence that this knowledge is 
acquired unconsciously and tacitly held.
In another recent experiment Mathews et al. (1989) 
found that subjects could consciously state the rules they used 
to classify novel strings. During the judgment test, subjects 
were periodically stopped and asked to give verbal 
instructions for someone else to perform the test. These 
instructions were later given to a group of yoked subjects who
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had not received any prior training. Yoked subjects then 
performed better than chance on classification of letter 
strings. Analyses of the verbal protocols revealed that most of 
the subjects expressed rules as consisting of specific letter 
patterns that should be selected or avoided, such as bigrams 
and trigrams, like that found in Perruchet and Pacteau's 
(1990) study. Mathews et al. (1989) claimed that there is a 
synergistic relation between prior experience with particular 
instances of the grammar and later attempts to explicitly learn 
the rules. These results challenge the standard view that 
learning of an artificial grammar results in abstract, complex 
knowledge.
Another conclusion reached in Reber’s (1976) initial 
study was that the observed implicit acquisition process was 
most effective when the instruction set was neutral rather than 
explicit. It was found that performance of subjects given 
explicit instructions to try to discover the rules differed from 
the performance of subjects who were given no instructions 
other then to memorize the letter strings. The explicitly 
instructed subjects performed more poorly on a grammatical 
test of novel letter strings and induced rules that were not 
accurate representations of the underlying structure, indicated 
by the inflated value of the probability of making an error on
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both presentations of a given item. Reber (1976) concluded 
that learning was most optimal in the implicit mode.
Parallel findings were reported by Reber, Kassin, Lewis, 
and Cantor (1980). They demonstrated an instructional set 
effect and concluded that it provided evidence that complex 
structures are acquired implicitly and unconsciously, and that 
such knowledge forms an abstract representational system. 
They also reported a reverse effect: instructions to search for 
rules enhanced performance in a structured array in which the 
underlying rules for letter order were simple and salient.
Since implicit learning is said to be yielded from complex 
stimulus environments in which the salience of the underlying 
structure is low, this finding does not run counter to the 
original claim for an instructional set effect. Similar 
observations regarding instruction set effects have also been 
made in somewhat different contexts by other researchers 
(Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Howard & Balias, 1980).
Yet, there have also been reported failures to replicate 
the implicit/explicit differences in performance (Abrams,
1987; Dulany et al., 1985). Using a procedure similar to that 
used by Reber (1976) in which subjects were either given 
neutral, focus, or hypothesis instructions, Carlson and Dulany 
(1985) provided empirical confirmation that the type of 
strategy instruction did not affect report accuracy, and more
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specifically, that the implicit instructional set did not produce 
an advantage. Several other studies have found no difference 
between implicitly and explicitly instructed subjects in both 
Reber's laboratory (Reber et al., 1980) and in others ( Dienes, 
Broadbent, & Berry, 1991; Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard- 
Fields, Cho & Druhan, 1989). Taken together, these disparate 
findings discredit the initial conclusion that neutral, implicit 
instructions are advantageous in learning complex structures.
In addition, Dienes et al. (1991), in re-examination of 
the proposed two distinct learning modes, concluded that 
subjects used a single learning mode rather than two modes. 
They did rot replicate previous results (Hayes, 1987) which 
indicated that a secondary distraction task, random number 
generation, interferes with learning when subjects are given 
explicit instructions but does not influence learning under 
implicit instructions. Results showed that subjects in both 
types of instruction sets experienced interference from the 
second task. Supported by the absence of an interaction 
between intentional versus incidental instructions and dual- 
task conditions, and the absence of a main effect of 
instruction set, they concluded that there were not distinct 
implicit and explicit learning modes or knowledge types that 
could be applied to synthetic grammar learning as was
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proposed by Reber et al. (1980). This issue is still being 
investigated.
A related issue concerns the extent to which implicit 
learning is the result of an abstract acquisition process. In an 
attempt to distinguish between two positions that are taken 
about what is learned, Vokey and Brooks (1992) contrasted an 
abstractive and a distributive approach. According to the 
abstractive approach, what is learned is an abstract 
representation of the structure of the stimulus. The 
contrasting distributive approach holds that knowledge is 
distributive, compiled of references to specific, similar prior 
episodes. Similarly, Me Andrews and Moscovitch (198S) 
postulated two models of classification in artificial grammar 
learning. The rule-based model holds that subjects classify 
novel instances on the basis of an abstract representation of 
the patterns. On the other hand, the exemplar-based model 
proposes that decisions are based solely on specific instances 
rather than abstract information. This model, along with the 
distributive approach, can account for implicit learning 
phenomena by proposing that subjects respond through 
analogies to specific remembered strings instead of 
postulating a mechanism of abstraction.
It is instructive to look at results that support the 
distinct approaches. Reber (1969, 1976) originally proposed
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the idea that if the knowledge is abstract then it should 
generalize to different stimuli sets when the same underlying 
grammar is used to generate the strings. Based on his finding 
that there were no significant effects on classification 
performance with changed letter sets, he concluded that the 
subjects had learned the abstract structure rather then 
learning specific strings. Parallel results were reported by 
Mathews el al. (1989). They found good transfer when 
subjects were trained on stimuli generated from one set of 
letters and later tested on letter strings written in a different 
set of letters but using the same grammar. Their conclusion 
was that grammaticality judgments were based on an abstract 
representation of the underlying structure of the grammar.
Taking the distributive view. Brooks and Vokey (1991) 
came to different conclusions in a procedure similar to that 
originally used, except the similarity of test items to specific 
training items was unconfounded from the grammaticality of 
the test items. To unconfound the variables of grammaticality 
(grammatical or ungrammatical) and specific similarity (close 
or far), they produced both grammatical and nongrammatical 
transfer strings in which some of each were similar to 
particular training items and some of each which were 
dissimilar. Transfer performance on the same letter-set was 
similar to that on the changed letter-set. Changing the letters
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during testing did not influence transfer performance. The 
authors caution that this transfer should not be taken as 
evidence of an abstracted grammar due to the fact that 
variance is more controlled by the similarity-to-old variable 
ratber than the grammaticality variable. Specific item 
analogies were an important contributor to transfer even in 
the changed letter sets. Therefore, it is plausible that transfer 
to changed letter-set strings in the Reber (1969) and Mathews 
et al. (1989) experiments was due to relational or abstract 
similarity between test strings and specific training stimuli, 
rather than to implicitly abstracted knowledge. The part of 
transfer not accounted for by verbalized rules could be due to 
relational analogy to prior instances, not abstracted 
knowledge.
In addition, Brooks (1978) claimed that implicit 
abstraction could not account for his results in a concept- 
discrimination situation. Subjects were given paired-associate 
lists in which one-half of the stimuli were generated from one 
grammar and the other half from a different grammar. Their 
subsequent performance revealed that they were able to 
distinguish the categories from each other above chance.
Since subjects did not know that there were two different 
categories, implicit abstraction seems implausible. A more 
plausible explanation is that subjects were comparing test
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items wi’h previous specific instances. In a different study 
(Allen and Brooks, 1991) using classification rules, it was 
further found that the accuracy of classifying new items was 
strongly affected by similarity to previously seen items. Their 
results are consistent with both the exemplar-based model and 
the distributive approach in that specific similarity plays a role 
in classification.
Contrary to Brooks and Vokey's (1991) argument.
Me Andrews and Moscovitch (1985) declared that even when 
the variables were unconfounded, classification performance 
could still be accounted for by an abstraction process when 
some aspects of the training situation were changed. The 
alterations in the design were done to provide a situation that 
did not encourage the use of either an analogy or abstraction 
process. Results indicated that both specific item and rule- 
based information were used by subjects selectively for 
appropriate tasks. Subjects were able to discriminate old from 
new grammatical items in the recognition task and use 
grammaticality information in classifying old and new letter 
strings. The data were taken to provide evidence that rule- 
based information can be abstracted and used for judgments 
of classification even when exemplar-based information is 
available. The authors concluded that their results provide 
support for the hypothesis (Reber, 1969, 1976) that
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knowledge of an artificial grammar can be implicitly 
abstracted. However, if implicit learning is a reliable 
phenomena, then previous experiments should not have 
demonstrated specific similarity effects (Brooks, 1978; Brooks 
& Vokey, 1991).
In sum, studies on implicit learning using the finite state 
grammar paradigm have not produced consistent 
interpretation of the results. There have been many failures to 
replicate the critical underlying claim that knowledge is 
abstracted unconsciously and used tacitly. Whether learning 
involves a rule-based, abstraction process or an exemplar- 
based, distributive process, or both perhaps in different 
situations, is still much disputed. No firm conclusion can be 
made regarding the role of implicit learning in artificial 
grammars other than the fact that there is a lack of agreement 
among results. The present exeriment was designed it! 
accordance with the finite state paradigm in order to liglitine 
the standard and alternative views of implicit learning.
Mother general research strategy which hai recently 
attracted attention as a paradigm for studying implicit learning 
is the sequence paradigm. It has been argued that subjects are 
able to acquire specific procedural knowledge without being 
aware that they had learned anything (Lewicki, 1986b; Lewicki,
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Czyzewska, and Hoffman, 1987; Lewicki et al., 1988). In a 
prototypical study involving sequential structure, there is a 
learning phase in which subjects are exposed to stimulus 
material that repeatedly follows some pattern. Later during 
lasting, subjects perform a task that is relevant to the pattern. 
Learning is revealed by a response bias that is consistent with 
the pattern. If the subject is unable to articulate the 
processing rules, then it is inferred that the knowledge was 
detailed implicitly or unconsciously.
A number of studies have demonstrated that subjects are 
able to acquire specific knowledge without being aware that 
they had learned anything (Lewicki, 1986b; Lewicki et al.,
1987). For example, Lewicki (1986b), using a matrix-scanning 
paradigm, had subjects view a series of frames and within each 
frame find the location of a target character. The relation 
between locations of the target and certain incidental cues 
presented with each frame was manipulated. Subjects 
acquired some information relevant to the patterns, revealed 
by response latency, without being able to articulate the 
pattern of stimuli and its processes. Lewicki (1986b) 
concluded that subjects did not use conscious knowledge to 
perform the task.
Similar findings were reported in a different study by 
Lewicki and his associates (Lewicki et al., 1987). Subjects’
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task was to locate the target in one of four quadrants of the 
screen and then press a button corresponding to its location. 
In the first six trials the target was easy to locate, but on the 
last trial of each block the target was presented on the 
background of distractor characters. The location of the 
seventh trial was determined by the sequence of locations of 
the target in a selected four out of the six preceding trials. 
Near the end of the sequence of trials the pattern predicting 
the target location was changed. Response latency 
significantly decreased over the trials, but then increased 
when the manipulated pattern was changed. In 
postexperimental interviews subjects revealed that they were 
not aware of the pattern. These observations suggest that 
knowledge about a complex pattern of stimuli can be 
unconsciously acquired and used tacitly.
Some important issues about Lewicki et al.'s (1987) 
results concerning the mechanisms underlying learning of the 
complex knowledge and subjects' awareness were raised by 
Stadler's (1989) replication of their experiment. To determine 
if learning was the result of perceptual or motor mechanisms, 
he employed two different transfer conditions. In the 
response transfer condition, a different response apparatus 
that had been used during training was used by subjects. In 
the position transfer condition, target position within a
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quadrant during the trials was different than during training. 
The data revealed that the position transfer condition 
produced a detrimental effect while the response transfer 
condition was slightly beneficial. This suggests that perceptual 
processes involved in acquiring the target played a role in rule 
learning.
Stadler (1989) also assessed subjects' awareness of the 
rules by using an objective definition rather than a subjective 
definition employed by Lewicki et al. (1987). Using a forced 
discrimination procedure that required subjects to predict the 
position of the target, he found no evidence that subjects were 
aware of the rules governing target location. In sum, Stadler 
(1989) extended the findings of Lewicki et al. (1987) that 
learning can occur without awareness and that this learning is 
based on perceptual processing.
The role of procedural knowledge that is not accessible 
to conscious awareness was further examined by Lewicki et al. 
(1988). In an effort to unconfound the factor of subjects’ lack 
of ability to articulate introspectively, the subjects selected 
were psychology faculty members. The results obtained were 
similar to those previously found in that subjects’ 
performance considerably improved despite that fact that they 
mentioned nothing of the manipulated pattern in interviews. 
The authors concluded that the acquisition of specific working
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knowledge is unconscious and that it could be used 
independent of conscious control.
The view of implicit learning taken by Lewicki and his 
colleagues (Lewicki et al., 1987; Lewicki et al., 1988) has not 
gone unchallenged. Perruchet, Gallego, and Savy (1990) have 
demonstrated that the results could be accounted for by the 
relative frequency of a few sequences of target location. 
Lewicki et al. (1988) sequenced the frames so that the first 
two locations of the target in the block (A and B) were 
randomly distributed. The last three locations (C, D, and E). 
however, were determined by second-order recurrent rules in 
that they depended on the two preceding locations of the 
target. The rules changed between presentations of C, D, and 
E. Performance in Lewicki et al.'s (1988) study, as measured 
by reaction time, improved more on trials C-D-E than on trials 
A-B, suggesting that subjects had implicitly learning the 
sequence of the last three.
Perruchet et al. (1990) determined that frequent and 
infrequent movements were not equally distributed over A-B 
and C-D-E trials. More importantly, infrequent events 
occurred predominantly in A-B trials, therefore reaction times 
should have been longer. The authors concluded that two 
factors may account for the difference in performance 
between trials. One is the presence of an infrequent
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movement (horizontal) in trials A and B which lengthened 
response latencies. The other is the presence of another 
infrequent movement (backward) in the same trials, also 
contributing to the increase in reaction time. Thus, the 
differences in reaction time on the first two trials and the last 
three trials observed in the Lewicki et al. (1988) study could 
be attributed to the relative frequency of particular target 
movements. Moreover, subjects could explicitly predict the 
correct frequency of movements. Improvement in 
performance could not be attributed to abstract knowledge of 
the stimulus pattern; subjects may have been using knowledge 
of the frequency of events in the previous Lewicki (Lewicki et 
al., 1988) study. The claim that subjects used unconscious 
knowledge of the rules because none of them noticed anything 
about the pattern does not follow because performance could 
he accounted for without assuming that subjects acquired this 
knowledge. In sum, these data do not provide support for the 
initial findings that subjects have an ability to unconsciously 
abstract complex rules.
Different conclusions have been reached by Willingham, 
Nissen, and Bullemer (1989) and Hartman, Knopman, and 
Nissen (1989). The former authors used a spatial serial 
reaction time task and obtained two different measures of 
conscious awareness, a verbal report and a generate test in
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which subjects had to press the computer key corresponding 
to where they thought the next stimulus would appear. For 
twelve of the subjects who reported no awareness of the 
stimuli pattern, performance on the generate task was similar 
to that of a group of subjects who indicated that they had 
detected a pattern but could only demonstrate knowledge of 
less than four of the ten positions in the pattern.
Still, a sizeable proportion of subjects were fully aware 
of the pattern and could demonstrate knowledge of more than 
four positions. Performance of the aware group was 
significantly better than the other two groups. Since some 
subjects failed to show explicit knowledge but performed well, 
the authors concluded that the relationship between implicit 
and explicit learning is complex and that there are individual 
differences. The results indicate that learning is not entirely 
implicit in sequential structure tasks since most subjects «SK 
aware of the structure and consciously used their knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge has been found in other undies as well 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Hartman et at., 1989; 
Perruchet et al., 1990).
Hartman et al. (1989) examined implicit learning of a 
series of new verbal associations. Verbal reports were 
obtained after training and subjects were divided into two 
groups, aware and unaware. Of the IS subjects of Experiment
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1, about half stated that they were aware of the sequence, but 
only five of these were able to accurately articulate more than 
three consecutive words. Further analysis revealed that the 
aware group learned a great deal more than the unaware 
group, yet the latter showed evidence of a small amount of 
learning. In contrast, the rest of their experiments revealed 
that subjects without conscious knowledge demonstrated 
robust learning of the sequence. The authors concluded that 
learning verbal responses is an implicitly acquired skill, 
despite the suggestive results of their first experiment. The 
lack of agreement within their own experiment provides 
counter-evidence to their conclusion. If what they were 
observing was truly an implicit phenomena, requiring no 
explicit recollection, then the results obtained should have 
been otherwise.
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) also proposed that 
learning sequential structure required little explicit 
processing, but that subjects became increasingly sensitive to 
the temporal context set by previous elements of the 
sequence. Using a small finite state grammar that produced 
legal transitions between successive trials of a stimulus that 
could appear at one of six positions arranged in a horizontal 
line on a computer screen, they found that subjects had little 
reportable knowledge about the sequential structure even
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though reaction times indicated that they had become 
increasingly sensitive to it. On a subsequent generation task, 
subjects averaged about 25% correct predictions while chance 
was about 17%. The authors stated that subjects had acquired 
some explicit knowledge despite the low accuracy, but later 
claimed that conscious knowledge played little role in the task 
because there were many cases when performance improved 
without a concurrent increase of explicit knowledge. 
Cleeremans and McClelland's (1991) theoretical interpretation 
was that learning of the sequential structure could not be 
accounted for by explicit knowledge, but their own results do 
not entirely support this position. The role of explicit 
knowledge in learning a sequential structure is still 
unresolved.
Another key issue is the relation between attention and 
implicit learning. Nissen and Bullemer (1987) had subjects 
perform a serial reaction time task under single task 
conditions and dual-task conditions. When subjects were 
required to count the number of high-pitched tones they 
heard while presented with the sequence there was a low level 
of performance similar to untrained subjects revealed by 
reaction time and the generate test. The tone counting task 
was employed to provide distraction of the attentional 
resources in the learning of tne sequence. Performance in the
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single task condition and of subjects who had Korsakoff’s 
syndrome indicated learning, despite introspective reports 
which revealed lack of explicit memory of the pattern. The 
authors concluded that learning is dependent on attentional 
processing, while awareness of the pattern is not required. 
Similar findings have been reported by other researchers 
(Hartman et al., 1989; Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991).
However, one study produced different results regarding 
the role of attention (Cohen , Ivry, & Keele, 1990). They 
employed a finger tapping task as a distractor in the learning 
of a sequential structure, and found that there was as much 
improvement in performance in the presence of the distractor 
as in the single task condition. The authors caution that the 
distractor task that they used, a primary tapping task, was 
very different from the secondary tone task used by Nissen 
and Bullemer (1987), in that they are processed by different 
modalities and that this difference could account for the 
disagreement among their results. A key finding from the 
Cohen et al. (1990) study is that subjects in the dual-task 
condition at first revealed no awareness of the pattern, but 
upon removal of the distractor awareness increased. Since 
subjects indicated awareness of the sequential structure in the 
absence of distraction, previous studies that have
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demonstrated that subjects are unaware of their knowledge 
are methodologically challenged.
In examination of N'issen and Bullemer’s (1987) study, 
Stadler (1992) found one specific result that could not be 
accounted for by their conclusion that unconscious learning 
occurred. Some repeating sequences in the former 
experiment could not be learned under dual-task conditions, 
but others could. The sequence was only learned if one of the 
events was always followed on the next trial by the same event. 
In other words, learning occurred only when there was a 
unique pairwise association between two events in the 
sequence. CBABA is such a sequence: B is always followed by 
A.
Stadler (1992) proposed that the statistical structure of 
the repeating sequence played a role in the learning of the 
sequence. In a ten trial sequence of four possible events, each 
event or run of two or more events can not occur an equal 
number of times. For example, regarding one of Nissen and 
Bullemer’s (1987) stimuli, he reported that in the string 
DBCACBDCBA, C is followed by A once, by B twice, and not at 
all by C or D. The constraints were more severe as the size of 
the run increased, and Stadler (1992) believed that this 
statistical constraint could account for the results.
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Evidence was provided by Stadler’s (1992) subsequent 
research. One set of his stimuli was generated by 
deterministic regularity, in which the structure of the 
repeating sequence was manipulated, and the other set was 
produced by probabilistic regularity in that the order of 
approximation to a repeating sequence was varied. Data for 
both sets of stimuli revealed that the more constrained the 
statistical structure was. the greater the learning. That is. 
reaction times were shorter for subjects who learned from 
stimuli that were statistically structured.
The author concluded that this provided evidence for an 
aggregate representation of the structure that is characterized 
by aggregates of bits and pieces of information taken from 
items, rather than a verbatim representation in which the 
sequence is represented event by event. Lewicki et al.'s (1987, 
1988) views on implicit learning is consistent with the 
verbatim representation, while Stadler’s (1992) argument is 
consistent with Perruchet et al.'s (1990). In sum, several 
studies have shown that learning of a complex sequential 
structure can be accounted for by factors other than implicit 
acquisition and abstract representation (Perruchet et al., 1990; 
Stadler, 1992).
In general, research on implicit learning involving 
sequential pattern acquisition has produced inconclusive
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results regarding the standard view. Since it has been shown 
that the relative frequency of sequences and the statistical 
structure of the sequence can account for the results of 
previous studies, then those early conclusions should not be 
taken as evidence supporting the claim that learning can occur 
without awareness and result in knowledge that is used 
unconsciously.
SYSTEMS PARADIGM
Besides the finite state grammar and sequence 
paradigms, another strategy to study implicit learning is the 
systems paradigm. Most of the research in this area has been 
done by Broadbent and his associates (see Berry & Broadbcnt. 
1984; Broadbent, 1977; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988) and have 
concentrated on examining the relationship between explicit 
knowledge and measured performance. The studies employed 
a variety of tasks, termed dynamic systems tasks since the 
subject is required to sustain control of some simulated 
system by learning an input-output relationship.
An early study (Broadbent, 1977) using a city 
transportation system had subjects control the number of 
open car parking places and the number of people using bus 
transportation by varying the price of the parking places and 
the time interval between buses. Performance was measured 
as the number of attempts to reach a specified target. It was
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found that through practice with the system subjects improved 
in the ability to make correct decisions but had difficulty in 
answering questions about the relationships between system 
components. Thus it follows that subjects had implicitly 
learned the relationship between input and output.
The dissociation between performance and verbalizable 
knowledge was further investigated by Berry and Broadbent 
(1984). They employed two different systems. In one task, 
subjects had to reach and maintain a specified level of sugar 
output while changing the size of a hypothetical work force. 
The level of production was related to work force by a specific 
equation such that there was not a unique output associated 
with any one input. The output depended on both the 
previous output and the present work force size. Performance 
was measured by the number of trials on which the specified 
output value was reached. In the other task, subjects were 
required to communicate with a computer person based on a 
set of adjectives varying in the degree of intimacy. The goal 
was to shift the computer nerson’s behavior to the 'very 
friendly' level and maintain it at that level. The equation 
relating the input and output values was the same as used in 
the sugar production task. Following each task was a 
questionnaire containing multiple-choice, prediction, and 
general questions.
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In Berry and Broadbent's (1984) first experiment they 
found that improved ability to control the system did not have 
any effect on the ability to answer questions. In their second 
experiment in which half of the subjects received detailed 
training about how to control and maintain the systems, the 
trained subjects scored significantly higher on the 
questionnaire but control performance for both trained and 
untrained groups was similar. Both experiments showed that 
the ability to control the system significantly improved with 
practice while practice had no effect on the ability to answer 
questions. Verbal instruction, on the other hand, improved 
the ability to answer questions yet had no effect on 
performance. The authors offered an interpretation of their 
results, suggesting that the tasks may have been performed in 
an implicit manner without subjects being aware that they had 
learned the important relationships among system 
components, yet cautioned that the written questionnaire may 
not have been an adequate test of explicit knowledge.
Sanderson (1989) has also suggested that questionnaires are 
not representative of the amount of conscious knowledge that 
subjects obtain.
Broadbent, FitzGerald, and Broadbent (1986) also 
demonstrated a dissociation between control performance and 
verbal knowledge in both the operation of a transportation
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system and an economic system. The authors found that two 
factors could increase the amount of verbalizable knowledge, 
either a reduced number of variables in the situation, or more 
salient variables. By making the equation relating input and 
output salient, such that output was directly related to the 
input, there was an observed improvement in ability to answer 
questions regarding the relationship. This finding does not 
run counter to the theoretical claims of implicit learning 
because accordingly, tasks that are relatively salient and 
conspicuous respond well to the explicit mode of learning, 
while tasks that deal with complex relationships are better 
handled by the implicit mode.
On the theoretical side, Hayes and Broadbent (1988) 
have proposed the distinction between two types of learning. 
Learning in the selective mode (s-mode) is effortful, selective, 
and reportable, and is the type of learning in which would be 
called explicit by Reber (1989). It results in a conscious, 
verbal model of the task. The other type of learning is the 
unselective mode (u-mode) and involves the mtselective 
aggregation of frequency information. Learning is assumed to 
occur unconsciously in this mode, like that of Reber's (1989) 
implicit learning.
Hayes and Broadbent's (1988) study used two different 
computer people, one which was learned by subjects hi s-
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mode (salient relationship), and the other which was learned 
in u-mode (unsalient relationship). The equations relating the 
input and output were similar except that there was a lag in 
response of person U. Employing a reversal learning 
paradigm, results revealed that subjects in the s-mode 
condition iearned significantly more than those in the u-mode 
condition and could accurately report more of their 
knowledge. However, under dual-task conditions, the s-mode 
group failed to learn. These results follow from the 
predictions of the two proposed learning mechanisms. Since 
the learning system in s-mode is limited in conscious storage, 
interference is expected from a second task. On the other 
hand, learning in the u-mode is unavailable for conscious 
evaluation and interference should not be expected. In sum. 
Hayes and Broadbent's (1988) results provide support for the 
standard view of implicit learning.
Parallel results were obtained by Berry and Broadbent 
(1988) regarding the distinction between the s-mode and u- 
mode. They found that when there was a salient relationship 
between input and output variables, learning progressed in an 
explicit way and verbal knowledge was high. When the 
relationship was non-salient, explicit knowledge was low and 
subjects learned the relationship in an implicit way. This 
would seem to support Reber’s distinction between implicit
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and explicit learning processes. Transfer of learning from one 
system to another conceptually similar task was good for both 
groups, but when subjects were explicitly informed of the 
relationship they showed no transfer. If tasks were performed 
in an explicit manner subjects should have demonstrated good 
transfer when they were instructed of the relationship. Hence, 
the salience of the underlying relationship between input and 
output variables in systems tasks is important in the 
implicit/explicit distinction of learning.
Yet, a recent study has shown that subjects do obtain 
conscious awareness of the relationship in systems tasks 
(Stanley, Mathews, Buss, Kotier-Cope, 1989). When subjects 
gave concurrent verbalization of their performance strategies 
control performance improved, unlike the results of Berry and 
•roadbent (1984). Various forms of verbal training also 
facilitated performance. If knowledge was used in an implicit 
manner, then neither of these results should have been found. 
Yoked subjects who received training from skilled subjects’ 
reports performed significantly better than control subjects. 
Thus, subjects had verbalizable knowledge of the learned 
relationship, la other words, subjects acquired the knowledge 
explicitly and used it consciously. These observations suggest 
that implicit learning is not solely accountable for control 
performance in systems tasks.
To sum, results obtained using the systems task in 
examination of implicit learning are as inconclusive as those 
obtained in other paradigms. The lack of consistent evidence 
in support of the standard view calls for a re-examination of 
the originally proposed distinction between implicit and 
explicit learning, and more specifically, the claim that 
knowledge can be acquired independent of consciousness and 
used in the same manner.
COVARIATION PARADIGM
The final research strategy used to investigate implicit 
learning phenomena is the covariation paradigm. On the 
standard view, the effects observed in these studies are 
thought to represent tacit knowledge of an abstract 
covariation of a set of features found in a given episode. 
Lewicki and his colleagues are responsible for the 
advancement of this view, declaring that the processing of 
social stimuli is inaccessible to conscious awareness and that 
these stimuli are acquired unconsciously (Lewicki, 1985,
1986a, 1986b; Lewicki et al„ 1988). The processing of a 
correlation between two stimulus features then influences how 
people perceive subsequent encounters with the two features.
Lewicki (1985) showed that a single experience with a 
person could influence decisions on a later task. Subjects 
were interviewed by an experimenter who acted either friendly
Explicit Learning
38
Explicit Learning
3 9
or rude toward! the subject. Later subjects were shown 
photographs of two different people and asked to choose 
which one appeared more friendly. Subjects reliably chose the 
person who was physically similar to the experimenter if the 
experimenter had previously acted in a friendly manner. In a 
different experiment the same results were found. Subjects 
were asked to enter a lab room and to approach the one of
two experimenters there who was currently free. Previous to 
this situation, the subjects had a brief interaction with a third 
experimenter who looked similar in appearance to one of the 
models. This interaction had either contained an unpleasant 
behavior on the part of the experimenter or it had not. When 
subjects were forced to approach one of the two later 
experimenters, subjects who experienced the unpleasant 
behavior chose the experimenter who was most unlike the first 
one. Most subjects could not determine what had influenced 
their choice and declared that it was completely random. This 
study could be said to have shown implicit learning in the 
sense that subjects appeared to be unaware of their knowledge 
and used it unconsciously.
Another study by Lewicki (1986b) further supports the 
standard view. Subjects were provided with photographs and 
short descriptions of stimulus people. There was an unsalient 
covariation between the person’s length of hair and the
Explicit Learning
4 0
character description. Processing of the covariation was 
measured by the two-stage process of question answering 
proposed by Glucksberg and McCiosky (1981). They found 
that response latency is longer when the stimulus material that 
subjects are exposed to prim’ to answering the questions 
contained relevant information to the question than when 
there was no relevant information. That is, a rapid decision is 
made if the question contains no relevant information, and a
longer decision is made if relevant facts have to be examined. 
Therefore, if a person registered information about categories
x and y, then response latency should be longer for the sort of 
question “is x in category y?” than “is x in category z?“
Lewicki (1986b) used this model to determine if subjects 
had learned the covariation, and the predicted reaction time
pattern was obtained. Subjects who were exposed to specific 
material responded more slowly to relevant questions than 
non-relevant questions, and answered in a biased manner
consistent with the covariation. However, they were unable to 
articulate the reason for their choice. Even subjects who were 
exposed to as few as two instances demonstrated learning of 
the covariation. Lewicki (1986b) concluded that subjects 
could retrieve and evaluate information specific to the 
covariation that was implicitly learned despite the subjects’ 
lack of awareness.
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Dulany and Poldrack (1991) re-examined Lewicki’s 
(1986b) study and found many artifacts that could account 
for Ms results. Using the same procedure, they failed to 
replicate the previous reaction time results. However, analysis 
of the data revealed that subjects* first four judgments for 
questions were longer than die last set. Then, using a biased 
sequence of question presentation in which the four relevant 
question were asked first, Dulany and Poldrack (1991) 
obtained the same reaction time results of Lewicki (1986b). 
Subjects were demonstrating a practice effect rather than 
unconscious learning. Also, reported rules correlated with 
correct rules for Dulany and Poldrack's (1991) subjects. The 
correctness of response varied linearly with mean validities of 
reported rules and subjects with zero rule validity usually 
scored zero correctness. The fact that there was no under 
prediction from subjects* rules shows that the judgments 
cannot be attributed to an unconscious symbolization of the 
covariation. Subjects were aware of the rules that they were 
using. Lewicki’s (1986b) results should be taken critically in 
light of these recent findings.
Once again, the notion that tacit knowledge about an 
abstract covariation can be acquired unconsciously can not 
consistendy account for results in the covariation paradigm. 
This runs counter to the standard view of implicit learning.
Similar discrepancies regarding the status of implicit learning, 
as revealed in the finite state grammar, systems task, and 
sequence paradigms, suggest that the proposed implicit 
learning phenomena is not as unconscious and abstract as its 
proponents would like us to believe.
Reber (1976, 1989) originally proposed that implicit 
learning occurs when stimuli are complex, relationships are 
nonsalient, and learning is unintentional. The resulting 
knowledge, an abstract representation, is considered to be 
acquired unconsciously, used tacitly, and is inaccessible to 
conscious and verbal reporting. This view holds up in light of 
certain evidence (Hayes A  Broadbent, 1988; Lewicki, 1986b; 
Reber, 1976; Reber, Allen, A  Regan, 1985) but can not account 
for other results (Dulany A  Poldrack, 1991; Dulany A  Wilson, 
1990; Perruchet, Gallego, A  Savy, 1990; Perruchet & Pacteau, 
1991; Stadler, 1992). Due to the methodological limitations 
of standard view experiments, the interpretation of their 
results is currently being reanalyzed. If learning truly can 
occur implicitly, then their effects should be more robustly 
revealed in experiments. The lack of consistent, robust 
implicit learning phenomena suggests the need for future 
investigation.
experiment
Explicit Learning
4 2
There were four aims of the present finite state grammar 
experiment. The first aim was to determine if evocative 
mental episodes consist of an activation of one conscious 
content by another conscious content. For our purposes, this 
meant that a string that is grammatical or nongrammatical 
would activate a sense of grammatical category, either 
grammatical or nongrammatical. More specifically, the 
strategy was to determine if the evocative mental episode 
could be explicitly remembered and expressed as a reportable 
rule predicting subjects' performance. The second aim was to 
determine the specificity of these evocative mental episodes. 
Implicit memory should be specific; therefore, learning should 
not be revealed in transfer to novel items. A third aim was to 
test whether an explicit learning procedure could produce 
evocative mental episodes, implicit learning according to the 
alternative view, and the last aim of the experiment was to 
determine whether explicit memory is better than implicit 
memory after an explicit learning condition.
More specifically, the present experiment was concerned 
with explicit learning and its role in establishing implicit and 
explicit knowledge. I hypothesized that an explicit procedure 
of searching for and using rules would produce not only 
explicit knowledge of those rules but implicit knowledge 
manifest in direct evocation of a sense of grammatical status
Explicit Learning
43
from features associated with status information during 
learning. Explicit procedures could also produce implicit 
knowledge through a process of automatization of judgment- 
in advanced stages, it becomes implicit learning. Implicit 
knowledge should be manifest in specific contents of 
awareness evoking the grammatical status. Thus, that process 
of evocation should be capable of being recoded in subject 
rule reports that tap explicit knowledge. I therefore examined 
the consequences of explicit learning under two conditions, 
one a speeded judgment designed to tap implicit knowledge, 
and one a more reflective judgment designed to tap explicit 
knowledge.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 36 undergraduate students at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This resulted in 
one group of 18 subjects who were in the explicit memory 
assessment condition, and 18 subjects who were in the implicit 
memory assessment condition. All subjects participated for 
course credit in an introductory psychology course.
Desiyn
Within-subjects factors were 10 learning trial blocks, 
three string lengths, and four string types for t!u; 11th block at 
memory-transfer test, and for the 12th block at rule
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assessment. Between-subjects factors were explicit vs. implicit 
memory conditions at the memory-transfer and rule 
assessment blocks.
Materials
The experiment was run on IBM computers.
Programming was accomplished with the MEL (Micro 
Experimental Lab) package. Stimuli consisted of letter strings 
generated from the finite state grammar used by Oulany, 
Carlson. & Dewey (1984), and earlier by Reber and Allen 
(1980) (see Figure 1). The set of strings for learning in
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blocks 1-10 were six grammatical and six nongrammatical 
strings. The grammatical strings were generated by the 
grammar, and nongrammatical strings were generated by 
substituting impermissible letters in the grammar. For blocks 
11 and 12, four types of strings were presented: (a) 12 old
strings used during learning, 6 grammatical and 6 
nongrammatical; (b) 12 novel strings with old letters, 6 
grammatical and 6 nongrammatical; (c) 12 novel strings with 
new letters, 6 grammatical and 6 nongrammatical, each 
obtained by transforming a learning string by raising each 
letter one step in the alphabet, and (d) 12 more novel strings,
obtained by applying the same transformation to the strings in 
(b) (see Table 1).
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Procedure
Instructions. Instructions on the computer screen 
conveyed the following: "During this experiment you will be
asked to learn about two kinds of letter strings. Half of the 
strings will be well-formed by a set of grammatical rules, and 
half will not be well-formed. We will show you strings that are 
well-formed, followed by a "W”, and strings not well-formed, 
followed by an "N".
For example,
LFJC W (well-formed)
Or for example,
FCRJ N (not well-formed)
Your task will be to classify strings as W or N before we 
tell you the classification. The well-formed strings called W 
are constructed by a set of grammatical rules and tho e called 
N violate a grammatical rule. Each time you see a string and 
need to classify it, try to remember what suggested strings 
were classified W or N before. And each time you see a string
classified as W or N, try to figure out what makes strings a W 
or N."
Subjects were told that on each of the first 12 trials 
there would be a I second warning and the string would be 
presented for 3 seconds. On trials after that the string would 
be presented for 2 seconds followed by its classification as W 
or N for 1 second. They were also told to respond accurately 
and quickly when the string appeared, and that it was 
especially important that they responded within those 2 
seconds. Subjects were instructed to press the computer key 
marked "W" if the string was W, and the key marked "N" if it 
was N. (These keys correspond to the keys 1 and 2 on the 13M 
PC keyboard.) Subjects were run either individually or in 
pairs.
Training. Training consisted of 10 blocks of 24 trials 
(letter strings), 6 of which were grammatical and 6 of which 
were nongrammatical, with each string randomly presented 
twice. Strings were shown one at a time on the computer 
screen. The intra-trial sequence was as follows: a Is warning,
2s presentation of the string, followed by Is feedback. The 
first 12 strings (6 grammatical and 6 nongrammatical) were 
presented without feedback to obtain baseline performance. 
The remaining trials were followed by feedback a constant 2 
seconds after string appearance. The total time per trial was
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4s, Bach Mock of 24 trials was followed by a 10s break in 
Wkfcfc (objects were told that they could rest.
ilteiariM ransfer assessment. There were two conditions 
i§ the ttth  Mock, an explicit memory condition and an 
implicit memory condition. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to conditions. This Ilth block provided a test of memory for 
old strings and a test of transfer to three types of novel 
strings: 12 new strings formed on old letters, 12 new strings
that transformed old strings by raising each letter one up in 
the alphabet, and 12 new strings obtained by the same 
transformation on the new strings formed on old letters. The 
24 strings on the old letters were presented first randomly 
intermixed over grammatical and nongrammatical, old and 
new. The 24 strings formed on the new letters were then 
presented, randomly intermixed over grammatical and 
nongrammatical, and over transformations of old and of new 
strings. The total number of swings presented once was 48.
Explicit memorv-transfgr. Subjects in this condition 
were informed that the first 24 strings would be formed with 
the letters they had been seeing, but the second 24 would be 
formed with new letters. Subjects' instructions were the same 
as Ia the learning blocks, except for the following: subjects
were informed that when they saw a string made with old 
letters that they should try to remember and use what
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•agfeited strings were W or N before. When they saw a string 
•M ia with new letters, they should also try to remember what 
made strings W or N before and use that information to 
classify strings with new letters if they could figure out the 
relationship of the new letters to the old letters. Subjects were 
instructed to try to remember the prior classification and/or 
some rule that would classify the string and to press the 
corresponding key as to whether is was G or N. Subjects were 
also told that there would no longer be feedback after each 
string.
Intra-trial time intervals were the same is in blocks 1-10, 
but what previously was the feedback-with-string interval 
before became continued presentation of the string without 
feedback.
Implicit memory-transfer, in this condition subjects 
were informed that some things would be the same and some 
things would be different than the previous trials. They were 
told that the Erst 24 strings would be formed with the letters 
that they had been seeing, but that the second 24 would be 
formed with new letters. Instructions conveyed the following: 
"Oh each trial there will be a .5 second warning, a string will 
be presented, and you will have 1 second in which to say 
whether you think it is well-formed, a W, or not, an N. When 
y«V see a string made with old letters, you should clear your
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mind and respond with the first thing that comes to mind,
•ither W or N. And when you see a string made with new 
tetters, you should also just clear your mind and respond with 
the first thing that comes to mind, either W or N." Subjects 
were also told that there would no longer be feeadback after 
every string.
Intra-trial sequences were different than blocks 1-10.
The warning was now .5 seconds and the string was only 
displayed for 1 second in which subjects had to make their 
response. In what was previously an interval of feedback-with- 
string before became continued presentation of the string 
without feedback. The time intervals in the implicit condition 
were shorter to discourage the use of deliberative memory.
Rule assessment Block 12 consisted of an assessment of 
the rules that the subjects were using in making their decisions 
regarding grammaticality. As in block 11 there were two 
conditions. Subjects that were previously in the implicit 
memory-transfer condition received the implicit rule 
assessment condition, and subjects that were in the explicit 
memory-transfer condition remained in the explicit rule 
assMiment condition.
Implicit rule assessment. Subjects' instructions were the 
same as the implicit memory-transfer condition in block 11 
except for the following addition: "immediately after every
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fourth trial you should report what it was about the string that 
actually suggested to you that it was a W or an N at the time 
you responded. After you classify the string, you will see 
aumbers appear indicating the position in order of each letter. 
Type one number that marks the start of and one number that 
marks the end of whatever actually suggested to you that the 
string was a W or N when you responded.
For example, if you see- 
LFJC 
1234
And FJ suggested W or N to you, you would type 23
If LFJC suggested W or N to you, you would type 14
And if F suggested W or N to you, you would type 22 
Use the numbers along the top of the keyboard to make this
response. And be sure to report what you thought at the time
you classified the string."
In assessment trials the same 48 strings that were 
presented in block 11 were presented again, once each, with 
the same constrained randomization. In order to get subjects 
up to speed before the assessment trial, however, the 
assessment trial always followed three dummy trials in which 
subjects only had to classify the letter string. Strings for 
judgment on the dummy trials were 12 old and 36 new (48 
total), differing from the strings used in assessment trials and
randomly intermixed. There was a total of 96 trials. Subjects 
had as much time as needed to make their report; however, 
the experimenter closely monitored subjects to ensure they 
were doing the task.
Explicit rule assessment. Instructions were the same as 
the explicit memory-transfer condition except for the addition 
of the following: "Immediately after every trial you should
report what it was about the string that actually suggested to 
you that it was a W or an N at the time you responded. After 
,'ou classify the string, you will see numbers appear indicating 
the position in order of each letter. Type one number that 
marks the start and one number that marks the end of 
whatever actually suggested to you that the string was a W or 
N when you responded." Following these instructions was 
displayed the same example as was given in the implicit rule 
assessment condition. The same 48 strings presented in the 
memory-transfer block were used, with the same constrained 
randomization. There was a total of 48 trials in this condition.
Results
Learning
Subjects learned partial knowledge of the finite state 
grammar, and performance in classifying strings improved 
over the first ten blocks. For all subjects, the mean proportion 
correct was .487 in block 1, compared to .698 in block 10.
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The data were analyzed with a 2 x 3 x 10 (Test x String Length 
x Block) mixed analysis of variance. ANOVA with dependent 
variable of proportion correct responses showed a significant 
effect for the factor of block, £  (9, 306) = 4.623, £  = 0.000. 
This demonstrates that performance improved during the 
learning blocks (see Figure 2).
Insert Figure 2 About Here
There was an effect for string length, £  (2, 68) * 34.178, 
£  = 0.000, and a significant string length by block interaction, 
£  (18, 612) * 9.644, q. = 0.000. Subjects' performance in 
classifying letter strings of different lengths improved 
differentially, with strings of the length of three showing the 
most improvement. There was no memory test by string 
length interaction, £  (2, 68) = 0.133, £  = 0.876.
ANOVA revealed no effect of memory test, £  (1, 34) * 
0.899, £  = 0.350. The implicit and explicit memory test 
subjects did not differ in performance in the learning blocks. 
There was no memory test by block interaction, £  (9, 306) ■ 
0.726, £  = 0.685. Also, there was no significant three-way 
interaction of memory test by string length by block, £  (18, 
612) = 1.289, £  = 0.188.
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With number of on-time responses as the dependent 
variable there was an effect of string length, £  (2, 68) = 7.939. 
jL = 0.001, and there was a significant interaction of string 
length by block. £  (18, 612) -  2.937, p  = 0.000 (see Figure 3). 
Strings of the length of three had more on-time responses 
overall than the other two lengths, but the longer strings 
increased more in their number of on-time responses. There 
was no effect of block, £  (9, 306) = 0.886, & = 0.538, nor of 
memory test, £  (1, 34) = 0.016, & = 0.900. Significant 
interactions of string length by memory test and of block by 
memory test were not found, £  (1, 34) = 1.307, p  * 0.277 and 
£  (9, 306) = 0.681, p = 0.726, respectively. There was no 
three-way interaction of string length by block by memory 
test, £  (18, 612) * 1.185, p  = 0.267.
Insert Figure 3 About Here
Across all subjects there was a decrease in response time 
over blocks, £  (9, 306) = 3.470, p  * 0.000 (see Figure 4). 
Subjects were quicker in their responses in block 10, M. * 
1206.39 seconds, than in block 1, M. s  1263.67 seconds.
There was a string length by block interaction, £  (18, 612) = 
24.930, p  = 0.000, revealing a differential decrease in 
response time for strings of different lengths over blocks;
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however, there was no effect of string length only, £  (2, 68) = 
0.308, a, = 0.736. Letter strings of the length of three showed 
the largest decrease in response time. A power function was 
fitted to the response time data for letter strings of the length 
of three, exhibiting a reasonable fit to the data, y=l215.2x* 
0.059498, r2 -  ,90 . Thus, automaticity was achieved with one 
portion of the stimulus set according to the power law 
criterion (Logan, 1988).
There was no effect of memory test with response time 
as the dependent variable, £  (I, 34) * 1.913, a  = 0.176. There 
was no interaction of memory test by string length, £  (2, 68) = 
0.053, a  = 0.948, nor of memory test by block, £  (9, 306) = 
0.437, a  = 0.914. A three-way interaction of string length by 
block by memory test was not found, £  (18, 612) * 0.487, a  * 
0.964.
Insert Figure 4 About Here
Transfer of Learning
Analysis of block 11 revealed transfer of learning only 
within the original letter set (see Table 1 for the letter string 
types). Whatever had been learned about the original strings 
could not be applied directly to the new letter set. A t-test (2 
tailed) showed a significant difference for performance on
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trials 1-12 in block 1 and the same letter strings presented in 
block 11, i  (17) « -4.081, p. = 0.001 for the explicit memory 
group, and 1 (17) * -3.680, p, ■ 0.002 for the implicit memory 
group, demonstrating transfer to a memory test on the 
original strings (see Figure 5). There was also a significant 
difference, for the explicit memory group, between block 1 
trials 1-12 and new strings generated on the old letter set in 
block II, 1 (17) = -4.042, & = 0.001, while the implicit group 
did not show this effect, l (16) * -0.008, p. * .888. What was 
learned of the original strings helped classification 
performance of new strings within the old letter set for the 
explicit group alone.
Insert Figure 5 About Here
An index of the specificity of the learning is found in the 
contrast of proportion correct of block 1 trials 1-12 versus 
proportion correct of the different types of novel strings in 
block 11. A t-test showed no significant difference between 
performance in block 1 trials 1-12 and novel strings generated 
with new letters, t  (17) = -1.232, a  * .235 for the explicit 
group, and 1 (15) = -.355, p. = .728 for the implicit group.
There was also no difference compared to old strings 
generated with new letters, l  (17) = -.756, p, = ,460, and t (17)
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= -.555, g  = .586, for the explicit and implicit groups, 
respectively. Performance on novel strings was equivalent to 
performance at the beginning of the task, which was around 
.50, or chance level.
Explicit Memory vs. Implicit Memory
A between-subject ANOVA with dependent variable of 
proportion correct did not show a difference between memory 
test groups in block 11 over all strings. £  (1,31) * .617, g  = 
0.438. Performance in classifying strings was not different for 
the two memory groups. There was not an interaction of 
novel strings by test, E (1, 31) * 1.496, g  = 0.231. There was 
no interaction of letter set by test, E (1, 31) = 0.059, g  =
0.809. A three-way interaction of letter set by novel strings by 
memory test was not found, E (L 31) = 1.389, g  = 0.248.
Cost of Novelty
The proportion correct of the strings used in learning 
and the new strings presented in block 11 had means of .685 
and .554, respectively. A 2 x 2 x 2 (Novel x Letter Set x 
Memory Test) analysis of variance with proportion correct as 
the dependent variable showed a significant effect of letter set, 
E (1. 31) * 17.221, g  = 0.000. There was no effect for novel 
strings, E (1, 31) = 3.061, g  = 0.090, and no letter set by novel 
strings interaction, E (1. 31) = 3.848, g  = 0.059.
Representation of Knowledge
Explicit
From the awareness assessment block, reported niies 
features within strings were analyzed using the VALSCORE 
program in order to obtain validity scores for each subject (if  
Duiany et al. 1984 for original explanation of VALSCORE).
Each of the subjects' reports is a rule in the sense that (a) it 
names a feature that could appear in a set of strings and (b) it 
predicates a grammatical status of the string containing that 
feature. The rules that subjects report are scaled on a validity
metric, on a very general scale, P (Event is in the correct
category/ Feature i is in the event). In the classification task, 
the correct category is either the set of grammatical strings 
when a rule asserts that a feature makes the swing 
grammatical or the set of nongrammaticai strings when a ride 
asserts that a feature makes the string nongrammaticai. A 
feature is a letter or a sequence of letters that (hi subjects
report.
The rationale of VALSCORE is »  follows: (a) subjects 
select a string as grammatical or nongrammaticai based on a 
feature, either a letter or a sequence of letters, and report this 
feature on the assessment trial, (b) the proportion of correct 
responses is computed according to the subjects' classification 
ef the string, (c) validites are computed according to the 
probability that the rule that subjects reported correctly 
categorizes a string, given the presence of the feature it
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represents, and (d) a correlation is done to determine if the 
validities can predict the proportion correct. If perfortnlBec 
is controlled by conscious rules then it is expected that a 
substantial correlation would be found, and more important, 
the frequency of correct responses should not exceed that 
predicted by rule validities.
All of the subjects' responses to the assessment task 
were checked for failures to follow instructions to report a 
feature by pressing the number keys that corresponded to the 
letter position. The reversal of the starting and ending 
numbers is an example of a report error. Trials with errors 
were discarded from the analysis since there was no reason to 
believe that subjects were reporting a feature at all.
For each subject, validity scores and proportion correct 
were calculated for the assessment trials in block 12. Next, 
correlations were computed for the case when a feature was a 
letter or sequence of letters in the given position that subjects 
reported counted from first to last. Displayed in Figure 6 is 
the scatter plot of the proportion of correct judgments and 
mean validity of rules, shewing r * .597, with a slope of 0.644 
and an intercept of 0.2S4. The mean proportion correct on 
assessment trials in block 12 was .62, and the mean validity of 
reported rules was .57. Subjects' reported rules predicted
classification performance, indicating that conscious ratal 
were guiding their grammaticality judgments.
For none of the subjects did a binomial test reveal a 
significant standardized residual between rule validity and 
performance, g  > .05. There was no underprediction from die 
reported rules so error in relations of rule validity to 
proportion correct was random error, not systematic 
underprediction that would suggest unconscious learning and 
memory effect. However, the validities and proportion 
corrects themselves are misleading because the frequencies on 
which proportion correct and validities are computed were 
often low once not-ontimes and errors are removed, and the 
frequencies were variable; thus, the correlations are 
diminished by the inflated values of discrepant validity and 
proportion correct when there were few observations.
Discussion
The present study was motivated by four aims; (I) to 
determine whether subjects consciously or unconsciously 
represent the knowledge which drives responses in a finite 
state grammar task, (2) to determine if explicit learning can 
produce implicit knowledge, (3) to determine if the knowledge 
gained can be used in classifying novel letter strings, and (4) 
to determine if explicit memory is superior to implicit memory 
after explicit learning. The first aim has been met in that
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partial knowledge of the finite state grammar was acquired 
with explicit learning instructions, and this knowledge which 
drove the subjects' responses was consciously represented, as 
revealed by the awareness assessment. The knowledge that 
subjects gained was specific; subjects were able to t;ansfer the 
knowledge they learned only to letter strings with the original 
letter set and only as revealed in an explicit memory test. The 
explicit learning resulted in both explicit and implicit 
knowledge, and overall performance was equivalent in both 
types of memory tests.
The analysis of awareness assessments showed that 
subjects formed a set of consciously available rules which 
could be explicitly remembered and expressed as a reportable 
rule predicting grammatical categorization. For example, a 
subject may have formed the rule "RF suggests grammatical" 
and used that rule to make the report that "LRF is 
grammatical". These rules were imperfectly valid but 
sufficient to explain the significant but imperfect levels of 
performance, as shown by the lack of significant residuals.
The measurement of the validity of these reported rules was 
done through the use of VALSCORE, a program introduced by 
Dulany et al. (1984). VALSCORE computes the probability that 
a reported feature corresponds to a grammatical classification 
of the letter strings. To determine the predictability of the
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subjects' task performance from the mean validity of the 
reported rules, a correlational analysis is done.
It was found that the validity of the subjects' reported 
rules in the present study predicted their classification 
performance, demonstrating that conscious contents 
correlated with the grammar were driving the performance of 
the classification response. Subjects acquired a "correlated 
grammar” such that subjects' reported rules and the finite 
state grammar made the same classification in the trials. This 
contrasts with claims that knowledge of the finite state 
grammar is unconscious and used without subjects' awareness 
(Lewicki, 198S, 1986a; Reber, 1967, 1976), but is in accord 
other claims that the representation is conscious (Dulany,
1991; Dulany et al., 1984).
Dulany (1981, 1984), as previously discussed, 
characterizes learning in the finite state grammar task as 
resulting in both conscious rules and evocative mental 
episodes consisting of an activation of one conscious content 
by another conscious content. In both implicit and explicit 
learning, mental episodes consist of conscious states yielded 
from other conscious states by nonconscious operations.
More specifically, the conscious status of a string is yielded 
from a conscious rule by a nonconscious operation of 
judgment within the judgmental episode. What differentiates
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implicit and explicit learning is the form of the mental 
episode. Explicit learning consists of flexible, deliberative 
operations on predicative contents. In contrast, implicit 
learning is characterized by activational operations on 
nonpropositional states. Dulany (1991) proposes a unified 
system for nonconscious operation upon conscious contents 
and states, rather than the separate systems assumption which 
postulates that consciousness and unconscious processes are 
located in separate systems and carry out different kinds of 
mental activities.
Explicit learning, according to Dulany's characterization, 
consists of deliberative processes in which there is an effort to 
determine and remember what it is about the string that 
makes it grammatical. Subjects form rules in which 
predication in awareness produces activation, thereby 
establishing connections between contents of awareness.
There is a propositional remembrance that "Feature i implies 
or suggests grammatical status.” In notation form, Belief that 
(Fj —> G), or Belief that (Fj — > N) where —> denotes the 
predicative "suggests” or "implies." In advanced stages the 
rule within the deliberative episode becomes an evocative 
mental episode; Belief that (Fj —> G) becomes Aware of (Fj) -- 
-> Aware of (G). Conscious predication produces activation, 
yielding an evocative mental episode from a propositional
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content that had participated in deliberative episodes. The 
propositional content "Fj implies G" is recoded as a full mental 
episode formed on the sub-propositional content "Fi activates 
G." This was captured in the present study by the power 
function fitted to response time for the letter strings of the 
length of three: learning began with very slow deliberative 
processing and then moved to evocative processing.
Dulauy has suggested that a different learning principle 
operates in implicit learning. Implicit learning results in 
automatic, activations! operations on nonpropositional states, 
such that co-activation produces mutual activation.
Therefore, Aware of (Fj), Aware of (G) becomes Aware of (Fi) 
—> Aware of (G). This mental episode, like the deliberative 
one in explicit learning, consists of nonconscious operations 
on conscious modes and the contents they carry. There is an 
automatic evocation of one nonpredicative content by another 
by an activation operation. What is often thought of as 
unconscious and automatic can be viewed as a relatively 
inflexible activational connection between conscious contents 
of the nonpredicative kind.
It was demonstrated in the present experiment that the 
evocative mertai episode was explicitly remembered after its 
occurrence and expressed as a reportable rule predicting 
grammatical categorization. By explicit remembrance, any
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such evocative mental episode can be re-codeable as a rate. 
Remembrance that (Fj - -> 0 ) or Remembrance that (Fj — > N) 
where — > denotes predication. Each remembrance is a 
propositional rule in awareness, a rule that recodes the mental 
episode. By remembrance and inference, evocative episodes 
may be symbolically represented within propostions, which 
then participate in deliberative episodes.
In the present study explicit learning resulted in both 
explicit and implicit knowledge, as revealed by classification 
performance in the two memory conditions. Evocative mental 
episodes, or implicit knowledge, were produced by an explicit 
learning procedure, further supporting Dulany's view that 
deliberative predication results in an activationa! mental 
episode. Subjects began the task with a deliberative effort to 
determine and remember what it was about the strings that 
made them grammatical, and by the last block this knowledge 
was automatized as revealed by the significant decrease in 
response time. After automatization, awareness of all or part 
of a string such as LRF may evoke awareness of "grammatical." 
What was once a rule within deliberative episodes became an 
evocative episode resulting in implicit knowledge.
The knowledge about the grammar that subjects 
acquired during the learning blocks could only be transfered 
within the original letter set, and could not be applied directly
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to new strings with new letters or old strings with new letters. 
Explicit memory subjects showed transfer of learning to new 
strings with old letters, revealing the generality of explicit 
knowledge. Explicit memory is distinctively deliberative, but is 
no purely deliberative. All remembering is evocative, but 
explicit memory is that process in which deliberative 
processes may be used in one of two ways: to find the feature 
that evokes a remembrance, or to make inferences beyond 
what has been evocatively remembered. It is distinguished by 
intermixing the deliberative with the evocative; explicit 
memory can therefore be more general. Subjects may have 
remembered certain features from old letter strings that 
suggested their grammaticality status, and applied this 
knowledge to the new strings with the old letters since there 
was an overlap of features.
In contrast, implicit memory consists of a pure evocative 
mental episode and is specific. Thus, implicit memory should 
fail to transfer to novel strings with the same letter set, while 
explicit memory is capable of this transfer of knowlege. The 
results of the present study provide support for this claim.
This contrasts with previous findings of transfer (Mathews et 
at., 1989; Me Andrews & Moscovitch, 1985; Reber, 1969,
1976). The learning resulted in a pure evocative mental 
episode, such that when Fi and G had been associated in
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learning, Fj directly activated G in remembering. Thus, in an 
implicit memory test, knowledge was therefore specific, and 
learning failed to transfer to novel strings, with same of 
different letters under the old grammar. Since explicit 
memory is more general, transfer was found to new strings 
within the old letter set.
After explicit learning neither the explicit memory group 
nor the implicit memory group showed superior performance 
in classifying strings as revealed by proportion correct 
analyses. Even though subjects were taught to rely upon 
explicit memory in the explicit learning procedure, implicit 
memory performance was equivalent to explicit memory 
performance. This result is in accord with Dulany's view that 
mental episodes that are initially deliberative become 
automatized by an evocative episode. Therefore, whatever is 
learned explicitly can be revealed both explicitly and 
implicitly.
Conclusion
The question of whether the knowledge acquired and 
used in a finite state grammar task is unconsciously or 
consciously represented was confronted in the present study. 
The prediction of the proportion of correct responses by the 
subjects' reported rule validities demonstrate that conscious 
contents are driving the performance of the subjects. The
Explicit Learning
explicit learning procedure resulted in not only explicit 
knowledge by also implicit knowledge. Also, the knowledge 
that subjects gained was specific; subjects were able to 
transfer the knowledge they acquired over a narrow range of 
stimuli. Therefore, an alternative view of implicit/explicit 
learning, which posits that learning is driven by conscious 
contents, is supported.
* * *  U " 7 J
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Table 1
Letter Strings Used in Learning. T.ansfer and Test
OLD STRINGSOLD LETTERS/ LEARNING, TRANSFER AND TEST 
Grammatical Non-grammatical
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LRF
FCF
LRRC
nnapp
LRCRFR
LRJ
RC
LRRC
RRFR
FLRFJCf
LRCRLR
OLD STRINGS-NEW LETTERS/ TRANSFER AND TEST 
Grammatical Non-grammatical
LFR
FCJ
LFJCJ
PCHC
LRRCFR
FCRHCL
LFJ
RJ
LFJRJ
HRFR
LCRFXL
RRFJRL
NEW STRINGS-OLD LETTERS/ TRANSFER AND TEST 
Grammatical Non-grammatical
MSG
GDG
MSGKD
GDSGS
GDGKDKM
MGKDSGS
MSK
GKD
MSGMD
GKSGS
GM9GKDK
MGKDSMS
NEW STRINGS-NEW LETTERS/ TRANSFER AND TEST 
Grammatical Non-gTainniatieal
MGS
GDK
MGKDK
GDGKD
MSGKDGS
GDSGKDM
MGK
GMK
MGKSK
GKSGS
lfl)SGKDM
GD6GKSM
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Finite state grammar.
Figure 2. Proportion correct in blocks 1 -10 as a function of 
string length.
Figure 3. Number of on-time responses in blocks 1-10 as a 
function of string length.
Figure 4. Response time for blocks 1-10 as a function of string 
length.
Figure 5. Proportion correct in block 11 as a function of letter 
string type and test condition (strings-letters).
Figure 6. Correlation of proportion correct and rule validities.
Explicit Learning
7 9

Pr
op
or
tio
n 
C
or
re
ct
•J 
tA 
W
Length 3 
Length S 
Length 7
Block
R
es
po
ns
e 
Ti
m
e 
(m
se
c)
1400
4
Length 3 
Length 3 
Length 7
Block
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
C
or
re
ct
0.8
Block 1 Baseline Old-Old Old-New New-Old New-New
Letter String Type
08
U
Im © 
U
co
In
g.
2&•
y - 0.25478 + 0.64278* R*2 .  0.357
0.4 I | I f■■" > '"I... | .. I1 | l
0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Validities
